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Comments
OFFSHORE OIL PLATFORMS WHICH POLLUTE THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL TREATY IMPOSING STRICT
LIABILITY
This Comment considers the legal ramifications of an offshore
oil well explosion which spills oil into the marine environment of
another nation. The Comment suggests that no effective interna-
tional law exists to govern the legal issues spawned by these inci-
dents-including questions of liability, damages, and compensa-
tion-and proposes the conclusion of a new international treaty
imposing strict liability on a nation when an offshore structure
within its jurisdiction causes transnational oil pollution. The cur-
rent utilization of the strict liability concept in various sources of
"customary" international law supports this standard of liability.
INTRODUCTION
Offshore oil drilling has become an important source of revenue
from the oceans. Over the past two decades, nations have built a
growing number of offshore oil platforms.' Many of these wells have
been involved in accidents resulting in oil spills into the surrounding
waters.2 These incidents have demonstrated the potential for trans-
boundary pollution in the marine environment of neighboring
nations.3
No effective international law exists to govern the legal issues
1. Note, Ixtoc I: International and Domestic Remedies for Transboundary Pollu-
tion Injury, 49 FORDHAM L. Rav. 404, 405 (1980).
2. These have occurred in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Persian
Gulf. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
3. Only one incident, Ixtoc I, actually resulted in transnational pollution. Several
oil spills in the North Sea and Persian Gulf almost resulted in transnational pollution but
were stopped in time. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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which inevitably follow these transnational disasters.4 These issues
include questions of liability, compensation, -damages, and
enforcement.5
The Ixtoc I disaster illustrates the need for international legal re-
sponsibility for accidents involving offshore oil wells. On June 3,
1977, the Ixtoc I oil well in the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico,
exploded. Sedco, Inc. (a United States based drilling company)
owned the well. Sedco had leased the rig to "Permargo" (a private
Mexican drilling contractor), who was operating under its own drill-
ing contract with "Pemex" (Petroleos Mexicanos, the Mexican na-
tional oil company). The explosion discharged over three million gal-
lons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The resulting oil slick extended
along part of the Texas coast and damaged private beaches, public
parks, and the local tourist and fishing industries.6
The incident triggered a complicated series of lawsuits. The
United States government sued Sedco for damages resulting from
the contamination of its waters and resources, and for cleanup ex-
penses. Mexico denied any liability for the spill.8 The United States
was unable to sue the Mexican government, even though Permargo
and Pemex had acted under Mexican authority. 9 Neither Mexico nor
4. Some international law applies to offshore oil pollution disasters, but such law is
neither clearly defined nor effective. See infra note 8.
5. See Infra text accompanying notes 8-11, discussing the problems surrounding
the Ixtoc I disaster.
6. Note, Trouble Over Oiled Waters: Pollution Litigation or Arbitration-The
Ixtoc I Oil Well Blow-Out, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 281, 281 (1980) (the well was
being used for exploratory drilling operations. The spill was not capped until over nine
months later). See L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
7. Comment, Domestic and International Liability for the Bay of Campeche Oil
Spill, 6 INT'L. TRADE L.J. 55, 56 (1980).
8. Bath, Mexico, The United States and Selected Law of the Sea Issues, 35 IN-
TY R-AM. ECON. AFF. 1, 19 (1981). Professor Jorge A. Vargas, a former Mexican dele-
gate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III),
explains:
There exists no international responsibility which anyone could exercise against
Mexico for the blowout of Ixtoc I in terms of conventional international law. No
article on conventional international law obligates Mexico to pay any repara-
tions to a state because of pollution caused by Ixtoc I. According to existing
international law, only an illegal international act requires some action, but
Mexico has committed no illegal act nor has it violated any international obliga-
tion. To this date there exist 33 international conventions covering marine pollu-
tion, but none of them apply to Ixtoc I. Therefore, there is no existing interna-
tional law which is applicable. UNCLOS III asserts that it is the sovereign right
of each state to exploit its natural resources in conformity with the obligation to
protect and preserve the marine environment. Mexico has made every effort, at
extreme cost, to contain the blowout to avoid damage to marine ecology or to
other states. In so doing, Mexico has complied with international law.
Id. at 20.
9. Handl, The Case for Mexican Liability for Transnational Pollution Damage
Resulting from the Ixtoc I Oilspill, 2 Hous. J. INT'L. L., 227, 229 (1979).
For a narrative of the efforts undertaken by Pemex to cap the oil well, see Informe de
los Trabajos Reallzados Para el Control del Pozo Ixtoc L el Combate del Derraine de
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its agents (Pemex and Permargo) acted negligently or illegally in
operating the well.10 No domestic or international law existed to deal
with blowouts occurring on the high seas. 1
The Ixtoc I case illustrates the lack of effective international law
for offshore oil explosions producing transnational damage, as well as
the problems with using the traditional tort theory of negligence in
this area. The need for international rules to determine liability and
compensation following such an incident is clear. 2
This Comment will analyze the problem of determining liability
for transnational environmental harm resulting from offshore oil di-
sasters. It will argue that the best solution is to convene an interna-
tional conference to produce a multinational treaty. This treaty
should provide for the strict liability of any State which has an off-
shore oil platform operating under its jurisdiction. In drafting the
treaty, the conference should use the recent work of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC).
Petroleo y Determinacion de sus Efectos Sobre el Ambiente Marino (Report on the
works undertaken to control the oil well Ixtoc I, to fight back the oil spill and to deter-
mine its effects on the marine environment), Programa Coordinato de Estudios Eco-
logicos en la Jorda de Campeche, Mexico, 1980. Mexico created this commission in re-
sponse to the Ixtoc I oil spill. Interview with Jorge A. Vargas, Mexican-American Law
Institute at the University of San Diego School of Law, in San Diego (Nov. 1, 1983).
10. Bath, supra note 8, at 19-20. There was no specific "finding" of non-negligence
on the part of the Mexican government. The United States government believed insuffi-
cient legal support for their claim existed; the United States chose not to sue Mexico.
Proving that Mexico's negligence caused damage would be difficult. Id. at 21.
Traditionally, a State was held responsible for the environmental damage it inflicted
on another State only if negligence could be established. Id. at 21. Under this negligence
theory of State liability, certain elements had to be proven. Problems arise in using this
traditional negligence standard in the case of offshore oil well accidents. Difficulties in-
clude agreeing on a proper standard of care for the well operator and proving a causal
relationship between the operator's conduct and the injury.
11. See supra note 8. In March, 1983, Sedco, Inc. agreed to pay the United States
two million dollars to settle its portion of the suit. This offer was accepted. L.A. Times,
Mar. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 4. No decision on the merits of this case has been reached. Leigh,
Judicial Decisions, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 151 (1983).
12. For example, as recently as February, 1983, an Iranian offshore oil well ex-
ploded in the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, Iraq attacked the oil field by air and worsened
the damage, creating a severe oil spill in the Gulf. The slick threatened environmental
damage as it floated closer to several Persian Gulf countries. Cleanup crews could not
begin work because of the ongoing Iraq-Iran war. Thus, a war thwarted the containment
of the spill, even though there was a danger of significant damage to the marine environ-
ment. L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1983, at 11, col. 1. Iranian experts tried to repair the dam-
age during the subsequent months, while under constant fire from Iraq. Eventually, the
slick began to dissipate. In September, 1983, Iranian workers succeeded in sealing off the
remaining leakage. Telephone interview with Mr. Moge at the Mission of Iran to the
United Nations, in New York City (Sept. 27, 1983). See Financial Times, Sept. 22,
1983.
A model for the new treaty could be the 1971 Convention on In-
ternational Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 13 This
treaty assigns strict liability to the State within whose jurisdiction
the harmful activity originates. Similarities exist in the need for and
the policies behind both this treaty and the one proposed in this
Comment. Additionally, such a conference may rely on domestic law
which considers oil drilling an ultrahazardous activity subject to
strict liability. Before these issues are taken up, the failure of ex-
isting conventional international law to govern offshore oil drilling is
discussed.
FAILURE OF NEw 1982 CONVENTION TO REGULATE OFFSHORE
OIL POLLUTION
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) was established in 1973 by a United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly resolution calling for an international regime gov-
erning law of the sea issues.14 After many years of work, UNCLOS
III has completed the treaty (1982 Convention).' 5
The 1982 Convention includes a section on protection of the
marine environment. 16 This purports to be a worldwide framework
for protecting the world's oceans, yet fails to impose the interna-
tional legal responsibility necessary to guarantee effective compensa-
tion due to an offshore oil explosion which results in transnational
damage. Despite its laudable achievements, the Convention fails to
guarantee protection to States whose waters and shores are polluted
by oil spills from platforms in another State's waters. The Conven-
tion lacks definitive procedures for determining liability, guarantee-
ing compensation, and enforcing the adoption of international rules
in this area.
The 1982 Convention imposes a general obligation on all States to
protect and preserve the marine environment.' 7 In regulating pollu-
tion from offshore oil drilling, the Convention directs coastal States
to adopt national laws, and global and regional rules, which are to be
reviewed periodically.' 8 International minimum standards for pollu-
13. This resulted from the Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Objects
Launched Into Outer Space, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961
U.N.T.S. 0 (entry into force for the United States, Dec. 31, 1973).
14. Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Operational Oil Pollution: A
Proposal, 6 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 72, 85 (1982).
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention]. The
treaty will not become effective until one year after sixty States have ratified it. Id. art.
308.
16. Part XII is entitled, "Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment."
Id. arts. 192-237.
17. Id. art. 192.
18. Id. arts. 207-209. The international rules promulgated at the direction of the
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tion from offshore activities will be produced by international organi-
zations and diplomatic conferences. Yet none of the Convention's
provisions establish substantive rules regulating pollution; therefore,
no international pollution standards exist."' The Convention merely
establishes who should create these rules, and leaves the substance
for future negotiations.
Although the individual States are responsible for enforcing their
national laws and implementing the minimum international stan-
dards after they are established, the 1982 Convention does not pro-
vide an international procedure to enforce these States' obligations.2
This lack of an international mandatory enforcement mechanism un-
dermines the success of the Convention's provisions because there is
no guaranteed uniformity of enforcement. No international system
exists to regulate whether the measures the States adopt are
sufficient.
The Convention calls on States to fulfill their international obliga-
tions. If a State violates one of these obligations, it will incur liability
in accordance with international law. Yet the Convention fails to es-
tablish any true penalties in international law for these violations. 1
The Convention's pollution articles are primarily concerned with
treaty will represent a minimum level of protection, and will be binding on States in
enacting their national rules on marine pollution. 2 G. TIMAGENiS, INTERNATIONAL CON-
TROL OF MARINE POLLUTION 604 (1980).
Coastal States "shall adopt laws" to control pollution, and these laws "shall be no less
effective than international rules." States shall "harmonize their policies at the appropri-
ate regional level," and "shall establish global and regional rules." 1982 Convention,
supra note 15, art. 208, para. 5.
19. "States are left to their own devices and little is said of any standards of pollu-
tion, provisions for pollution control, or for enforcement procedures." Bath, supra note 8,
at 18. "[A]n effective regime to prevent pollution of the oceans requires, in addition to
the imposition of obligations on parties that use the oceans, the establishment of an au-
thority to enforce these obligations with respect to violations which occur outside the
jurisdiction of any particular state." Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Opera-
tional Oil Pollution: A Proposal, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 72, 89 (1982).
20. 1982 Convention, supra note 15, art. 214, is entitled, "Enforcement with Re-
spect to Pollution from Sea-bed Activities." States "shall implement applicable interna-
tional rules and standards established through competent international organizations or
diplomatic conference" to control pollution deriving from seabed activities in their juris-
diction. This is arguably a mere suggestion to States, and not a mandatory order.
21. 1982 Convention, supra note 15, art. 235 is entitled, "Responsibility and Lia-
bility," and affirms: "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obli-
gations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall
be liable in accordance with international law." This provision is "[d]esigned to provide a
framework for future action. It sets out fundamental principles but leaves considerable
latitude as to their implementation." DeMestral, The Prevention of Pollution of the
Marine Environment Arising from Offshore Mining and Drilling, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J.
469, 501-02 (1979).
the control of oil pollution from vessels. The incidence of oil pollu-
tion from vessels is far greater than that from offshore oil rigs, and
has received more international attention.22 Yet, as the number of
offshore oil disasters increases each year, the dangers from them be-
come more apparent. When an offshore oil structure explodes, there
is a great danger of severe pollution to the surrounding coastal areas.
This source of pollution did not receive effective detailed treatment
in the 1982 Convention. 8
SOURCES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Due to the failure of the 1982 Convention to impose international
legal responsibility for offshore oil disasters, no "conventional" inter-
national law is available to determine liability and guarantee com-
pensation. 24 However, the various sources of "customary" interna-
tional law reflect the emergence of the doctrine of strict liability and
22. Schneider, Codification and Progressive Development of International Envi-
ronmental Law at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Environmental Aspects of the Treaty Review, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 248,
257 (1981). Many of the articles specifically deal with vessel-source pollution. E.g., 1982
Convenation, supra note 15, art. 211, para. 5.
23. Traditionally, the sea did not belong to any particular State. Over time, States
have increased their claims over the world's waters. Borgese, The Law of the Sea, 248
Sci. AM. 42, 42 (1983). The 1982 Convention reflects this trend of extending States'
claims of jurisdiction and control over the oceans. For example, the 1982 Convention
establishes 12 nautical miles as the maximum breadth of the territorial sea. 1982 Con-
vention, supra note 15, art. 3. The contiguous zone is extended to 24 miles. Id. art. 33.
The continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone both extend 200 miles from the
coast. Id. arts. 57 & 76. The latter is a new addition to international claims over the sea.
Borgese, supra, at 44.
24. The two main sources of international law are treaties ("conventional" interna-
tional law) and custom ("customary" international law). Gamble, The Treaty/Custom
Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305, 306 (1981). Treaties are only binding
on party States. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1979). A
treaty is usually first adopted by an international conference. It then enters into force
through ratification by a certain number of States. When a State that was a party to the
convention ratifies the treaty, it becomes binding on that State. 2 G. TIMAGENIS, supra
note 18, at 605. Theoretically, "customary" international law is an expression of the
general consensus of States. I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 2. Each of these two main sources of
international law can affect the development of the other. Multilateral treaties are often
considered codifications of existing principles of customary law. Conversely, treaties can
form the basis of customary international law in a specific area. Gamble, supra, at 313.An advantage of treaties over custom is that the former clearly set forth the existing law
in an area. Customary international law can be determined only by analyzing the atti-
tudes and consensus of States.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, enumerates the sources
of international law. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38 [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. Statute]. That arti-
cle guides the court in determining what sources to apply in reaching decisions in accor-
dance with international law. The first source is international conventions/treaties, and
the second is international custom. These two are universally recognized as the mostimportant, and some legal experts have recognized the first as more important than the
second. I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 4. What one can read, and see, is inevitably an important
source; a treaty is a tangible piece of evidence of the law.
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support its application in transnational offshore oil accidents.25
The sources of customary international law include treaties,26 the
domestic laws of individual States, and the discussions of the United
Nations International Law Commission.
Treaties
Treaties are evidence of customary international law.28 Although
they bind only the States which are parties to them and govern only
a limited substantive area, they can be used as support in analogous
areas of dispute. For example, the 1982 Convention reflects the
worldwide concern for protection of the marine environment.2 9 The
detailed provisions regulating oil pollution from vessels could serve
as models of reference when drafting a new treaty regarding oil pol-
lution from offshore installations."0
Another example is the 1976 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations, a regional treaty regu-
lating liability in offshore oil accidents.31 Only the nations bordering
the North Sea, Baltic Sea, or North Atlantic Ocean may become
parties to this convention by acceding to it. This Convention reflects
the trend towards strict liability for offshore accidents. It subjects
offshore installation operators to strict liability for damage caused by
oil released during offshore operations.3 2 Thus, if transnational oil
25. "[W]hile offshore oil drilling is not subject to a strict liability convention of
global applicability, a non-fault standard of liability might nevertheless be argued on the
basis of an emerging norm of customary international law." Handl, The Case for Mexi-
can Liability for Transnational Pollution Damage Resulting from the Ixtoc I Oilspill, 2
Hous. J. INT'L L., 227, 235 (1979).
26. Gamble, supra note 24, at 313.
27. See infra notes 28, 61, and 73 and accompanying text.
28. Gamble, supra note 24, at 313.
29. See 1982 Convention, supra note 15, Part XII.
30. In the General Assembly's Sixth Committee meeting of 1981, one member
commented on the International Law Commission's [hereinafter cited as ILC] "Interna-
tional Liability" discussions (see infra note 79 and accompanying text) by suggesting
that the international rules on this topic be formulated by studying the various multilat-
eral and bilateral treaties on this subject over the past twenty years. 36 U.N. GAOR C.6
(52d mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.52 (1981) (statement of Mr. Bouony,
Tunisia).
31. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Opera-
tions, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1450 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Convention]. Off-
shore operations in the North Sea and the risk of oil pollution were developing rapidly.
The parties wanted to establish a liability standard similar to that provided by the Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. See infra note 34.
Dubais, The 1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from
Offshore Operations, 9 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 61, 61 (1977).
32. 1976 Convention, supra note 31, art. 3. The operator is strictly liable except in
pollution occurs, the victims are guaranteed compensation by the op-
erator or the insurer of the structure. The claimant may bring the
action in any State where pollution damage occurs, or in the State
which had jurisdiction over the oil operations. 3
The 1976 Convention reflects the gradual departure from common
law concepts of fault-based liability in favor of the doctrine of strict
liability.34 The scope of this agreement, however, is limited to the
North Sea nations. The international community needs other similar
regional agreements or a single international conference on a
broader geographical scale.
Other evidence of customary international law can be found in the
1971 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Space Treaty). 35 The treaty is concerned with trans-
national harm from falling space objects launched by States. 6 This
treaty utilizes a strict liability standard for transnational environ-
mental harm.3 7 It reflects the gradually increasing acceptance of this
standard in international law.
The Sixth Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly
convoked the international conference which produced the Space
the event of war, natural phenomena of an exceptional character, or the negligence of the
claimant. According to Article I of the treaty, an "operator" is the person designated as
such, for the purposes of this treaty, by the State within whose jurisdiction the offshore
activities are taking place. In the absence of such designation, it is the person in overall
control of the offshore activities. DeMestral, supra note 20, at 494.
33. 1976 Convention, supra note 31, art. 1.
34. Other efforts to regulate transnational oil pollution liability have resulted in
successful treaties. For example, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage of 1969 established limited strict liability on owners of oil-polluting
vessels. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
November 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 0, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970). Many of these
efforts have been developed under the auspices of the International Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization.
35. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/94, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 0 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Space Treaty]. This treaty was produced under the aegis of the
United Nations. All U.N. member States must ratify and accede to the treaty to become
parties.
36. Dembling, A Liability Treaty for Outer Space Activities, 19 AM. U.L. REv.
33, 34, 40 (1970). Strict liability has not been a popular concept in international law.
International Law Commission, Fourth Report on "International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law," U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/373, at 44 (1983) Nevertheless, strict liability was adopted in this 1971 treaty
which focused on a specific topic of international law. See Space Treaty, supra note 35,
art. II. If a space object launched by one State fell and caused damage within the juris-
diction of another State, the cause of the damage would be obvious. In the case of
marine pollution from offshore oil explosions, the questions of damage and causation are
not as easily resolved. Perhaps this difficulty explains States' reluctance to impose strict
liability in offshore oil pollution. The issues are more complex and ambiguous, and States
are hesitant to accept absolute responsibility in international law for the resulting dam-
age. Nevertheless, the urgent need for international responsibility today is apparent; a
multinational treaty imposing this international responsibility is desperately needed.
37. See Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. II.
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Treaty.38 As the building of artificial satellites and other space ships
proliferated, international concern increased over the possibility that
a space object launched by one State could fall in the territory of
another State and cause damage.39 Although few incidents of trans-
national harm actually occurred, the potential for harm was
recognized.40
The Space Treaty provides that a launching State is absolutely
liable for damage caused by its space object to another State.41 The
preamble of the treaty recognizes that damage from space objects
may occur even if the launching State has acted with due care. It
also recognizes the need for effective international law to guarantee
compensation for this damage. 2
Offshore oil drilling is analogous to man's use of space; therefore,
the strict liability concept formulated for space is similarly applica-
ble to ocean oil drilling. Space is a complex environment; man has
only limited knowledge of its physical characteristics. 3 Similarly,
the sea presents a hostile unknown environment." Like space, the
sea can accurately be described as "remote, esoteric, unconfined, and
inaccessible.' 5 Moreover, Exxon Corp., one of the world's major
private oil companies admits, "the geology of deep water offshore
areas is not yet well known."'46
Space exploration involves the use of advanced technology in an
38. In 1958, a United Nations General Assembly resolution created the Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In 1967 that Committee produced the initial
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, effective Oct. 10, 1967. Menter, Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space and National Security, 17 INT'L LAW. 581, 582 (1983). The "Space Treaty" was
produced in 1971. See Space Treaty, supra note 35.
39. See Space Treaty, supra note 35, at preamble.
40. See id.
41. Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. II.
42. Id. at preamble. The launching State must pay compensation to the injured
State (the State within whose jurisdiction the damage occurred). This treaty is at the
public international level (not private international law) and thus only States are parties
to it (not private individuals). Id. at preamble. The injured State makes the decision to
allocate the compensation it receives to the injured individuals within its jurisdiction. See
Dembling, supra note 36, at 43.
43. See Prevost, Law of Outer Space - Summarized, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 595,
595 (1970).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 595-96.
46. U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Select Committee on the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf, "O.C.S. Oversight of 1978 Amendments - Part 4" U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 1980, at 215 (pamphlet by Exxon called "Deepwater
Capabilities").
unknown environment. Strict liability was established in the Space
Treaty, in part, because of this use of technological equipment.
Drafters acknowledged that advanced technology renders a negli-
gence theory of liability impotent because determining the exact
malfunction causing injury is difficult,47 and because determining
negligent use or construction of advanced equipment is also
difficult.'
Offshore oil drilling equipment is similarly complex. Although oil-
well-blowout-preventers have been established, Exxon admits contin-
ued drilling requires technology not presently available.49 The Ixtoc
I disaster, previously discussed, demonstrates similar concerns in an
offshore oil drilling context-high technology equipment made negli-
gence liability impractical.50 Because a primary reason for adopting
strict liability in the Space Treaty similarly applies to offshore drill-
ing, the Space Treaty rule-strict liability-should be applied to off-
shore oil drilling.
The Space Treaty's procedure for asserting a claim can be applied
in the offshore oil drilling context. The Space Treaty allows a
launching State, after paying compensation, to present a claim for
indemnification to other States which participated in the launching,
because they are jointly and severally liable.5 A similar provision
would be desirable in an offshore oil pollution treaty, allowing a
State who has already repaired the damage to seek indemnification
against a private multinational oil corporation who owned or oper-
ated the offshore oil structure which exploded and caused the
damage.52
47. Dembling, supra note 36, at 35.
48. Id. A strict liability standard relieves the claimant of proving negligence. This
is helpful in the area of space object activities because showing reasonable conduct is
difficult due to the limited experience available from which to formulate a standard. See
Id. at 36, 37.
49. Id. at 208, 352.
50. See supra notes 8, 10.
51. Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. V(1), (2).
52. This would induce States to impose stricter regulations and control over off-
shore oil operations. Lay, Pollution From Offshore Oil Wells, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 105 (R. Churchill ed. 1973). The oil company could be forced to
pay as part of its risk in producing oil. Id. There would be no distinction between nation-
ally owned and privately owned oil companies. Regardless of oil rig ownership, the State
would be held responsible in the international arena because the oil corporation is legally
authorized to act under that State's legislation.
This Comment proposes a solution to transnational oil pollution at the level of public
international law. A State will be responsible for activities occurring within its jurisdic-
tion or control which injure another State, regardless of whether it is a government-
sponsored activity. If the State permits the activity, it will be held liable for any resulting
damage. Two international cases support this approach. See Levantino, supra note 14, at
91. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, establishes direct State re-
sponsibility for personal injury, and can be analogized to cases of environmental injury.
Id. Also, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 1905 (1949) imposed
direct State liability for the extraterritorial environmental injury caused by a private
[VOL. 21: 691, 1984] Comments
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Under the Space Treaty, a claim for compensation can be made
through diplomatic channels or through the United Nations Secre-
tary-General.5 3 If no settlement is reached after one year, the parties
establish a Claims Commission." The commission decides on the
merits of the claim. It then determines the amount of compensation
due.5 5 The compensation shall be determined in accordance with in-
ternational law to provide reparation to the condition which would
have existed if the damage had not occurred.56 The parties may
agree in advance that the commission's decision will be binding. If
they do not, the decision will represent a recommendatory award for
the parties to consider in good faith.5
The Space Treaty has special provisions to determine which State
is liable and the amount of compensation due.58 This is necessary for
the effective redress of transnational harm.
If these provisions were adopted in a new offshore oil treaty, com-
pensation would be guaranteed for a State injured by offshore oil
activities of another State. The defendant State would be strictly lia-
ble for this damage. The Ixtoc I incident illustrates that without
these specific rules and procedures, there is a danger of inadequate
compensation, multiple suits, and delayed settlement. 9
concern within its territory. Id.
53. Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX. Article X provides a claim must be
presented to a launching State within one year following the date of the damage, even if
the full extent of the damage is not yet known; but in that event, the claimant State may
revise the claim until one year after the full extent is discovered.
54. Id. art. XIV.
55. Id. arts. XVI(3) and XVIII.
56. Id. art. XII.
57. Id. art. XIX.
58. See supra notes 41-42, 51, 53-57 and accompanying text. Unless the State
parties have agreed to a private system of compensation, "a State within whose jurisdic-
tion an abnormally dangerous activity is conducted will be originally responsible and
directly liable for the damage caused by that activity, whether or not the State or the
operator of the enterprise was at fault." Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnor-
mally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 197, 229 (1972).
59. After the Ixtoc I incident, the United States and Mexico signed a bilateral
treaty which established a contingency plan for joint response to significant discharges of
oil into the waters of either State. The agreement is deficient because it fails to set proce-
dures or mechanisms for determining liability and compensation issues. The State parties
are "free to invest in response resources as they see fit," and there is no guarantee that
either one will significantly improve its response capabilities. Recent Developments, 23
HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 184 (1982). Additionally, the joint response can occur only when
the parties agree. Success in implementing the agreement requires mutual good faith.
See Transnational Pollution Agreement Regarding Marine Pollution Inci-
dents---"Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharge of
Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances," June 24, 1980, United States-Mexico,
Domestic Law of States
Evidence of customary international law can also be obtained from
the domestic law of States. Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice sets forth the sources of international law.60
One such source is "the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations." 6' 1 The practices of States often contribute to the de-
velopment of international law, by representing the "custom" in a
particular area of law.62 A domestic law concept will often be
adopted as international law if the policies behind the concept are
present in the international arena.6 3
The strict liability doctrine should be utilized in public interna-
tional law because the concept is now accepted in nations throughout
the world. For example, in the United States, strict liability is im-
posed on one who undertakes an "abnormally dangerous activity.""
Courts have determined that activities which pose a high degree of
risk of harm are "abnormally dangerous" in this context.65 In these
cases, the negligence (fault or wrongful intent) of the defendant need
not be proven. It is sufficient that the defendant knowingly engaged
in, or permitted, the abnormally dangerous activity.66
Various states have considered drilling oil wells on land an "ab-
normally dangerous activity."'67 In Green v. General Petroleum
Corp.,6" the defendant driller was held liable for damage resulting
T.I.A.S. No. 10021, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 696 (1980).
60. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 24.
61. Id. art. 38.
62. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
158 (1968); J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1963); I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1979); 48 C.J.S. Interna-
tional Law § 5 (1981).
It is not necessary that every state have similar laws in an area for custom to develop.
If a substantial number of States follow a similar practice, this practice may be evidence
of customary international law. See M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 132 (1968); Kelson, supra note 58, at 201.
63. Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 16, 32 (1957).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 78 at 510, 513 (4th ed. 1971).
68. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928). See W. PROSSER, supra note 67, at 510. In
Green, the defendant was legally drilling for oil in a residential district in Los Angeles
when a blowout occurred. Although the defendant had used due care in drilling the well,
he was held liable for the damage to the plaintiff's adjoining land.
The Green case has been approvingly cited in several subsequent California decisions.
Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (Green states a principle of
public policy in supporting strict liability for certain activities which are hazardous to the
general public; Green applies to both property damage and personal injury); Henderson
Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981) (Green is
presently interpreted as imposing strict liability on the basis of an abnormally dangerous
activity); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969)
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from an oil well blowout, even though he had not acted negligently.
California considers oil well drilling an "abnormally dangerous" or
"ultra hazardous" activity because of the potential risk of harm to
lands, waters, fish, and property. 9 Although Green involved oil drill-
ing on land, offshore oil drilling poses almost identical risks
Strict liability should be imposed when extrahazardous activities
are involved because, by definition, a high risk of serious injury ex-
ists notwithstanding the use of reasonable care. In international law,
these policies are expressed in the "Space Treaty." The creator of an
abnormally great risk is strictly liable because, between the creator
and the innocent victim, the one who engages in the dangerous
profit-making activity is best able to predict and allocate the risk of
loss. The enterprise can spread the loss through slightly higher prices
to consumers whereas an innocent victim cannot.7 0
The policies underlying strict liability in domestic law have been
similarly articulated in international law. Strict liability was adopted
in this treaty, in part, because "[taking into consideration that, not-
withstanding the precautionary measures to be taken by States and
international intergovernmental organizations involved in the launch-
ing of space objects, damage may on occasion be caused by such
objects. ... 71 Just as launching objects into space is an ex-
trahazardous activity,7 '2 offshore oil drilling is extrahazardous. Be-
cause domestic law recognizes strict liability for oil drilling, and be-
cause the policy underlying the rule is recognized in international
law, liability for international offshore oil drilling accidents should
be founded on strict liability.
(court refers to Green as finding that oil drilling is an ultrahazardous activity that can
not be safely carried on even if one uses reasonable care); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion
Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967); Beck v. Bel Air Properties, Inc.,
134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286 P.2d 503 (1955) (oil drilling is an ultrahazardous activity;
California limits the imposition of strict liability to activities which are clearly ul-
trahazardous even if due care is used).
69. Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising Out of Exploitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf. The Santa Barbara Disaster 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 514, 550 (1972).
70. See generally Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 744, 56
Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (discusses policy behind strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities).
71. Space Treaty, supra note 35, preamble.
72. Dembling, supra note 36, at 37.
International Law Commission
Finally, the work of the International Law Commission (ILO) can
function as a source of international law."' The draft articles and
discussions are evidence of customary international law.7 4 Ideally,
these ILC reports express the majority opinion of the world's na-
tions.7 5 In addition, all State representatives have the opportunity to
comment on the reports when the United Nations General Assembly
discusses them at their annual meetings.7 6
The ILC can produce conventional international law as well. Its
draft articles on a particular topic may be used by the General As-
sembly as the basis for calling a conference to develop a convention/
treaty.77
73. The International Law Commission (ILC) was established by the United Na-
tions General Assembly to codify existing international law and to promote the progres-
sive development of international law. W. FRIEDMAN, TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 38 (1972). To achieve the latter, the ILC Statute directs the com-
mission to prepare draft articles for conventions on areas which are not regulated by
international law, or areas in which the law has not been fully developed in State prac-
tice. Id. at 38. The ILC's members are experts in international law elected by the Gen-
eral Assembly with the goal of representing all of the world's major legal systems. M.
SORENSEN, supra note 62, at 141.
The ILC has no formal power to create laws. W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 51 (1979). At annual meetings, broad topics of
international law are discussed. See id. If and when agreement is reached, the ILC
presents a report to the U.N. General Assembly. Id.
Since 1980, The ILC has been discussing the broad topic of the international liability
of States for legal activities which produce injury to other States. "International Liability
for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law."
See Infra note 79. Although the doctrine of strict liability has not been definitively set
forth in these meetings, the discussions reflect increasing support for imposing this stan-
dard on States which produce transnational injuries. See infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
74. International Law Commission, Preliminary Report on "International Liability
for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,"
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ILC Preliminary Report]. This re-
port refers to such sources of customary international law already discussed as the 1982
Convention, id. at 248, the Corfu Channel Case, id. at 257, and the Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration, Id. at 257.
75. The ILC's members are international law experts. M. SORENSEN, supra note
62, at 141. This is different from a multilateral conference whose members are represent-
atives of individual nations.
76. Although an I.L.C. report to the General Assembly is not formally binding as
law, it carries legal significance. It represents a threshold of consensus, clearly con-
fronting States and requesting their reaction. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 2. The
General Assembly has no legislative powers; its resolutions are not formally binding on
United Nations member States or international law. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions
of the United Nations General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 Amer.
Soc'y. of Int'l. Law: Proceedings 301, 301 (1979). Yet it provides important evidence of
customary international law. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 24, at 2. States are free to imple-
ment or ignore these resolutions. Schwebel, supra, at 302. States use resolutions to create
change in their relationships with other States. Adede, International Law From A Com-
mon Law Perspective: A Second Look, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 46, 76 (1980).
77. W. FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, at 38-9. Conventions/treaties are the result of a
multilateral (or regional) "conference" or bilateral negotiations. M. SORENSEN, supra
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The ILC's capacity to serve as a source of international law re-
garding transnational offshore oil accidents is readily apparent. Its
recent discussions reveal the potential for producing conventional law
in this area.78 Since 1980, the ILC has been discussing the general
topic of the international liability of States for conducting activities
which are permissible under international law and yet cause damage
in another State." The ILC recognizes that these activities cannot
continue without consideration of their potential effects on other
states.80
The Commission is specifically concerned with those legal activi-
ties which, by nature, pose certain "risks" of harm. The ILC plans to
treat this as a broad topic, without restricting its application to any
particular subject area.81 Yet the Rapporteur for this topic notes
that it is usually discussed in the context of environmental hazards
caused by human activity and advanced technology.82
note 62, at 123.
78. See ILC Preliminary Report, supra note 74, at 248. The potential importance
of the ILC's discussions on this topic is demonstrated by the ILC's past success. In 1956,
the ILC produced draft articles on the general topic of the Law of the Sea, and recom-
mended the General Assembly convene an intergovernmental conference of State repre-
sentatives to produce one or more international conventions based on the articles. The
General Assembly followed the ILC's suggestion and assembled the first UNCLOS. See
Johnson, The Preparation of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8
INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 122, 129, 131 (1959). The General Assembly gave the ILC report
to the conference to use as the working basis for codifying the international law in this
area. See id. at 137.
UNCLOS I produced four conventions/treaties in 1958. Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. These treaties reflected the basic scheme of the ILC draft arti-
cles, and adopted many with only minor changes. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Ge-
neva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 73, 75 (1959). This
illustrates the influence ILC draft articles can have in the development and codification
of conventional law on a particular topic.
79. The title of this topic is "International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law." ILC Preliminary Report,
supra note 74, at 248. This topic was created specifically to deal with the consequences
of acts not prohibited by international law, to be treated separately from the ILC topic of
"State Responsibility" for internationally wrongful acts. Id. at 248.
80. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 32nd
Sess., [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 159, U.N. Dec. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. I
(Part 2) [hereinafter cited as ILC 32nd Sess.]
81. Summary Records of the Meetings of the 33rd Session, [1981] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 217, U.N. Doec. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981.
82. ILC Preliminary Report, supra note 74, at 248.
The I.L.C. appointed a "Special Rapporteur," Mr. Robert Quentin-Baxter, to study
In his third report to the Commission, the Rapporteur notes the
continued use of the strict liability concept in creating conventional
regimes, especially those dealing with activities which have a low
risk of accident occurrence yet a high risk of extensive injury if an
accident does occur.83 He realizes an unqualified commitment to
strict liability would probably not be accepted; conversely, the doc-
trine cannot be ignored in drafting pertinent articles."
In his fourth and most recent report,85 the Rapporteur concedes
the practical difficulty of articulating the reasonable standards for
States' activities. He agrees, theoretically, that strict liability of
States may be the best solution. Only this standard of liability will
guarantee compensation of transnational victims and preservation of
the environment. 86
The work of the Rapporteur on this topic of international responsi-
bility for legal activities is not only discussed within the ILC. The
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly also discusses the ILC's
work at its annual meetings.87 Within this committee, various na-
tions' representatives believe the concept of strict liability with
proper qualifications 88 should be considered as a basis for the ILC's
work on this "international responsibility" topic.89 Other representa-
the topic. A Rapporteur is a legal expert in a particular field who is appointed to take
notes and produce reports and/or drafts on the topic. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1883 (3rd ed. 1961). This report includes proposed draft articles. Only a
few, broad articles have been included in Mr. Quentin-Baxter's reports. International
Law Commission, Third Report on "International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360, at
24 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ILC Third Report].
83. Id. ILC Third Report, at 10-11. Beginning with the 1980 I.L.C. meeting, Mr.
Quentin-Baxter has presented four annual reports to the commission on this topic. In
1982 he drafted a general outline for a set of draft articles. Id. at 24. Mr. Quentin-
Baxter's reports influence the work of the I.L.C. in their further discussion of this topic.
International Law Commission, Report on the work of its thirty-fourth session, 37 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 185, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982). The articles are presented in
a form suitable for use as the basis for the conclusion of a future convention. ILC 32nd
Sess., supra note 80, at 50.
84. ILC Third Report, supra note 82, at 11.
85. International Law Commission, Fourth Report on "International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law," U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/373, at 44 (1983).
86. Id. at 44. The Rapporteur discusses the difficulty of articulating "[tlhe ordi-
nary standards of State responsibility for wrongful acts and omissions in ways that offer
practical solutions to current legal problems. The theoretical answer may be a move to
the standards of the strict liability of the State. The Commission will not wish to neglect
the reasoned arguments of Handl and others that this is a feasible standard, and the only
one which finally discourages the shabby compromises that assail the biosphere and leave
the victims of avoidable disasters with inadequate redress." Id.
87. Johnson, supra note 78, at 130, 132. The Sixth Committee, an organ of the
General Assembly, discusses legal questions. See id. at 130.
88. ILC 32nd Sess., supra note 80, at 13-14. Statement by Mr. Klein from Aus-
tria, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.52, Nov. 18, 1981. 36 U.N. GAOR C.6 (43d mtg.) at 12,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.43 (1981) (statement of Mr. Calero Rodrigues, Brazil).
89. See supra note 79.
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tives clearly support unequivocal strict liability in international law.
These members argue that the principle found in many States' do-
mestic laws should be extended to international law, to promote har-
monious relations between States.90
Furthermore, it is argued that international law should promote in
States a general feeling of taking responsibility for their activities.
This would discourage a State from acting negligently, or from al-
lowing those acting as their agents to so act.91
The topic of international responsibility for legal activities within
a State's jurisdiction is broad and complex. 92 The ILC's work in this
general area does not provide a sufficient basis to call a new interna-
tional convention. The Commission has not yet completed its discus-
sions. It will take years before a general, unqualified strict liability
standard is adopted by the ILC for all transnational injuries result-
ing from the lawful activities of a State.93
The dangers of transnational pollution from offshore oil activities
exist today. The concept of strict liability has been discussed as a
general guideline for States within this broad topic. This concept can
be derived from the ILC broad discussions and applied to the prob-
lem of offshore oil pollution, and thus accelerate the process of im-
posing strict liability in international law.
This can be accomplished by calling a new international confer-
ence to produce a treaty on this specific topic. An international con-
ference concerning this narrow area is a more feasible solution than
90. 36 U.N. GAOR C.6 (49th mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/36/SR.49 (1981),
(statement of Mr. El-Banhawy, Egypt). 35 U.N. GAOR C.6 (55th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe.
A/C.6/35/SR.55 (1980) (statement of Mr. Lacleta, Spain).
Therefore, the policy reasons underlying the members' support for the strict liability
standard in the ILC and the General Assembly's Sixth Committee can be applied to the
narrow topic of offshore oil pollution accidents. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the risks involved in offshore oil drilling, see supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text.
91. 36 U.N. GAOR C.6 (52d mtg.) at 11, U.N. Do. A/C.6/36/SR.52 (1981)
(statement of Mr. Gharbi, Morocco).
92. This area raises many questions, such as the involvement of private and mul-
tinational companies or individuals in owning or operating the legal activity.
93. The ILC required eight years of study to produce the final draft articles on the
law of the sea. See Johnson, supra note 78, at 127. The present ILC topic of interna-
tional responsibility see supra note 79, is even broader than the law of the sea topic. See
International Law Commission, Second Report on "International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law," A/CN.4/346
(33rd Sess., 1981), at 2. The ILC will probably take years longer to reach agreement on
the underlying principles of this topic. See supra note 35, 38 (the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly created the Commitee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1958; The
Space Treaty imposing strict liability was not produced until 1971).
waiting years for the completed ILC draft articles on the "interna-
tional responsibility" topic. A narrowly focused forum would provide
a more practical method of developing strict liability for transna-
tional offshore oil pollution. This forum should be an international
conference, called by the General Assembly, to develop international
rules regarding accidents involving offshore oil structures.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of strict liability in conventional international law is
limited to treaties representing a few particular areas. These areas
usually involve an allocation of risk associated with highly dangerous
activities.94 Although several sources of "customary" international
law support the imposition of strict liability in transnational offshore
oil disasters, the creation of "conventional" international law in this
area would be the most effective solution. A treaty would formally
bind the party States and would clearly provide for the determina-
tion of liability, compensation, and enforcement. A multilateral
treaty would be a more effective expression of international law than
the existing customary international law.95
In formulating this treaty, the drafters should consider the various
customary international laws relating to this topic. 6 An examination
of the 1971 Space Treaty would provide concrete suggestions of cer-
tain provisions which should be included in a new treaty governing
offshore oil accidents. Oceans are a common resource for the entire
planet, and deserve the specific legal attention already given to
space.
The International Law Commission reports, and the General As-
sembly's comments, reflect increasing recognition of the desirability
of imposing strict liability in international law. 7 This concept should
be applied in a new international convention specifically focused on
the development of rules governing offshore oil accidents with trans-
national effects. The General Assembly should convoke such a con-
ference before the problem worsens. International law regulating in-
cidents of transnational pollution in the marine environment from
offshore oil well accidents is urgently needed.9"
MELISSA B. CATES
94. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 74
(1974).
95. See supra note 24. The United Nations should convoke a conference to pro-
duce this multilateral treaty. This may encourage the development of future regional
and/or bilateral treaties in this area which would incorporate the principles from this
proposed multilateral convention.
96. See supra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
98. See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
